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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY, a corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 14,343

STERLING H. NELSON &
SONS, INC., a Utah
corporation, d/b/a
MURRAY ELEVATORS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Respondent accepts as sufficient the STATEMENT OF
THE KIND OF CASE and the RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL set forth
in appellantfs brief but wishes to clarify the explanation
of the DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT with the following statement:
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Judge Croft granted respondent's motion for summary judgment with respect to -befch- its complaint, entering
judgment for the additional freight charges, and against
appellant on its counterclaim based upon an alleged negligent
quotation of freight rates.
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Contrary to the representation of appellant in the
first line of page 2 of its brief, Judge Croft's decision
was not grounded upon "ICC case law" (none was cited to the
Judge either orally or in briefs of counsel) but rather upon
decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court which hold specifically
that misquotation of freight rates by an interstate carrier
will not estop such carrier from collecting the full and
correct amount of the transportation charges due nor can
such misquotation serve as the basis of a cause of action
against the misquoting carrier for alleged damage that may
have resulted from such misquotation.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent does not accept appellant's STATEMENT OF
FACTS as being either relevant to the issues of the case or
of sufficient detail to provide the court with a full and
complete explanation of the lawsuit and therefore submits
its own STATEMENT OF FACTS:
A.

HISTORY OF LITIGATION
In its initial answer to respondent's complaint,

appellant, in addition to denying liability for the freight
charges, alleged a counterclaim (R.158) claiming damages as
a result of respondent's alleged assessment of excessive
freight charges in violation of its tariff provisions.

After

a considerable amount of discovery by both parties, appellant
withdrew this counterclaim (R.69) and filed an amended counter-2Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

claim (R.62) alleging that any failure on its part to pay
the correct amount of freight charges was the sole result
of a negligent quotation of freight rates by respondent
and that, should appellant be required to pay such additional freight charges, it should be able to recover against
respondent damages in an equal amount.
In response to respondent's initial motion for summary judgment, filed July 22, 1975 (R.47), together with supporting affidavit (R.55) and memorandum of law (R.48), appellant filed an "Amended Answer and Counterclaim" (R.35)
alleging an additional "Seventh Defense" claiming that should
respondent be successful in defending against appellant's
counterclaim for negligent quotation of freight rates, such a
result would amount to a denial of a remedy against respondent
and would constitute a taking of appellant's property without
just compensation in violation of appellant's constitutional
rights.

The court denied respondent's initial motion because

of a question of fact raised in an affidavit (R.42) appellant
served on respondent at 5:05 p.m. the afternoon before the
hearing (R.14) .
Respondent filed the subject motion for summary judgment on October 1, 1975 (R.13), together with an additional
supporting affidavit (R.29) and supplemental memorandum of
law (R.14); and on October 16, 1975, Judge Croft signed the
order (R.8) granting said motion from which appellant has
taken this appeal.
-3Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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B.

FACTS OF CASE,
All the material facts of this case have been

either expressly admitted by appellant in its answers to
interrogatories and answers to requests for admission or
appear, unrefuted, in affidavits of an employee of respondent.
They may be succinctly stated as follows (the paragraphs are
numbered for reference purposes):
1.

The appellant made the shipments in question.

R. 119-126 (Requests for Admission Nos. 1, 6, 11, 16, 21, 26,
31, and 36) and R.110 (answer No. 1 to said Requests).
2.

The appellant paid freight charges for these

shipments totalling $13,016.76.

R.119-126 (Requests for Admis-

sion Nos. 2, 7, 12, 17, 22, 27, 32, and 37) and R.110 (answer
No. 1 to said Requests).
3.

The correct tariff items for calculating the

correct freight rates for each of the eight shipments are
those items set forth in respondent's first Requests for Admission, Nos. 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30, 35, and 40.
Appellant made this

R.119-126.

admission in its answers to respondent's

second Requests for Admission, Nos. 9-16, dated September 13,
1974.

R.66, 67.
4.

Each of these tariff items were at all material

times on file with the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)
and were published and filed in accordance with ICC requirements.

R.67 (Appellant's admission to Request No. 17).
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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5.

Applying these tariff items to the shipments in

question results in total freight charges for all eight shipments of $14,873.61, or $1,856.85 more than appellant has
heretofore paid to the respondent.

R.55-58 and R.29-32

(Affidavits of Mr. R. D. Barker).
In commenting on the STATEMENT OF FACTS made by
the appellant, respondent accepts as generally correct the
information set forth in paragraphs 1-8.

In regard to para-

graph No. 9, however, respondent takes issue with the statements therein and on page 12 of its brief to the effect that
respondent does not know what the correct rates for the shipments in question are.

Respondent's answer to interrogatories

quoted on said page 12 is taken out of context and misrepresents to the court the meaning of the answer which, when read
in full in response to the interrogatories, obviously refers
to shipments not the subject of this litigation.

Appellant

knows full well respondent is claiming as correct those tariff
items and rates set forth in respondent's Requests for Admission (R.119-126) filed at the outset of this litigation (July
2, 1973) and in Mr. Barker's affidavits of July 21, 1975, and
August 27, 1975 (R.55 and R.29).
ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

JUDGE CROFT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT WITH RESPECT TO THE PRAYER OF
ITS COMPLAINT.
-5Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT 2:

JUDGE CROFT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DENYING APPELLANT RECOVERY UNDER ITS COUNTERCLAIM.

POINT 3:

AFFIRMANCE OF JUDGE CROFT'S DECISION WILL NOT
INFRINGE ON APPELLANTfS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.

POINT 1:
It is axiomatic that a misquotation of freight rates
by an interstate carrier is no excuse for an aggrieved shipper
to pay less than the full and correct amount of transportation
charges legally due.

A misquotation of rates, the result of

either inadvertence or intentional conduct by the parties,
is no defense.

Probably the most frequently cited decision

to this effect is the case of Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Maxwell, 237 U.S. 94 (1915), wherein Mr. Justice Hughes made
the following oft-quoted statements at pp. 97-98:
Under the Interstate Commerce Act, the
rate of the carrier duly filed is the
only lawful charge. Deviation from it
is not permitted upon any pretext.
Shippers and travelers are charged with
notice of it, and they as well as the
carrier must abide by it, unless it is
found by the Commission to be unreasonable. Ignorance or misquotation of
rates is not an excuse for paying or
charging either less or more than the
rate filed. This rule is undeniably
strict and it obviously may work hardship in some cases, but it embodies
the policy which has been adopted by
Congress in the regulation of interstate commerce in order to prevent
unjust discrimination.
-6Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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'Neither the intentional nor accidental misstatement of the applicable
published rate will bind the carrier
or shipper. The lawful rate is that
which the carrier must exact and that
which the shipper must pay. The shipper's knowledge of the lawful rate is
conclusively presumed, and the carrier
may not be required to surrender the
goods carried upon the payment of the
rate paid, if that was less than the
lawful rate, until the full legal rate
has been paid. 1 —It was 'the purpose
of the Act to have but one rate, open
to all alike and from which there could
be no departure.' [Emphasis added.]
The rule of the Maxwell case has not been overturned
but, rather, has been affirmed in a long line of state and
federal court cases including cases from the U. S. Supreme
Court.

There is no dissent from its holding.

The following

is just a sampling of cases which have cited and follow this
decision, indicating its wide and unquestioned acceptance as
the law of the land on the issues at stake here.

Others may

be found in the annotation at 88 A.L.R. 2d 1375:
Texas & Pac. Ry., et al., v. Leatherwood, 250 U.S.
478 (1919); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., et al., 260 U.S.
156 (1922); Dayton Coal & Iron Co., Ltd., v. Cincinnati, New
Orleans & Texas Pac. Ry., 239 U.S. 446 (1915); Gilbert Imported
Hardwoods, Inc., et al., v. 245 Packages of Guatambu Squares,
More or Less, et al., 508 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1975); Nyad
Motor Freight, Inc., v. W. T. Grant Co., 486 F.2d 1112 (2d
Cir. 1973) ; Allegheny Corp. v. Romeo, Inc., 392 F.Supp. 38
-7-
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(W.D. Pa. 1975); United States v. Sea Train Lines, Inc./
370 F.Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); United States v. Pan Am.
Mail Line, Inc., 359 F.Supp. 728 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe R.R, v. John Sexton & Co., 3 39 F.Supp.
1202 (D. Kan. 1972); So. Pac. v. Miller Abattoir Co., 454
F.2d 357 (3rd Cir. 1972).
Contrary to what appellant would have the court
believe, the antidiscrimination provisions of the Interstate
Commerce Act (I.C.A.) [40 U.S.C.A. § 6(7) and the Elkins Act
Amendment, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 41-43], which serve as the basis
of the Maxwell rule, were never intended by Congress and
have never been interpreted by the courts to apply solely to
intentional, collusive conduct.
313 U.S. 450 (1941).

Union Pac. R.R. v. U.S.,

Granted, the prevention of intentional

discriminatory practices is one of the evils thought to be
eradicated.

But, in addition, it was also the intention of

Congress to insure that every shipper, large or small, pay
the same amount for the same transportation services.

If

a shipper is allowed to pay less than the going tariff rate,
a preference is involved whether it results from inadvertence
or collusive conduct.

Maxwell says precisely this:

"Neither

the intentional nor accidental misstatement . . ." (p.98)
[Emphasis added.]

The reasoning for this rule is obvious.

If a finding of "secret" rebates was the only criteria for
finding discrimination under the I.C.A., the door would be
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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left wide open for shippers to allege misquotation, whether
any misquotation was involved or not (or collude with the
carrier to misquote under the guise of inadvertence) and
rely thereon.

The end result would be preferential rate

making even though there might be no collusion on the part
of the carrier.

To avoid this possibility, the question of

intent, logically, does not enter the picture.
end result that the courts look to.

It is the

As stated in the case

of Materials, Inc., et al., v. The DeFonce Constr.Corp., 332
A.2d 788 (Conn. 1974), at p.789:
Even though there is nothing in the
evidence to suggest a sweetheart contract, a coerced discount, or a sub
rosa rebate, the court cannot extend
this protection to the defendant
because of certain fundamental concepts
arising out of the statutory regulation
of common carriers . . . The prevailing
view . . . is that a common carrier
has a right and a duty to recover the
scheduled rates regardless of contract
. . . This has long been the federal
view . . . The general policy that
rates filed with the regulatory commission must be observed pervades the
regulations of [contract motor] carriers
and is enforced by permitting any undercharges to be recovered in order to
preserve the integrity of filed tariffs.
The courts will not permit deviations
from filed rates to be validated by such
doctrines as mistake, agreement, estoppel
or unclean hands . . . This view also
prevails in the several states where
statutes regulate interstate carriers.
[Emphasis added.]
It is interesting to note that § 6(7) of the I.C.A.
does not make any reference to "secret" rebates or "collusive"
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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practices.

It simply states, in pertinent part, that:

No carrier . . . shall . . . charge
or demand or collect or receive a
greater or less or different compensation for • . . transportation of
passengers or property, or for any
service in connection therewith . . .
than the rates, fares, and charges
which are specified in the tariff
filed and in effect at the time.
Clearly, it is not benefits or burdens or collusive or negligent conduct which dictates whether payment of the full tariff
rate should be made but, rather, an overriding public policy
enunciated by Congress that, to the extent possible there shall
be a uniform, reasonable, and certain schedule of charges for
interstate and foreign transportation services.

Simply stated,

the question is not how or why a deviation from published
tariff occurred but whether, in fact, it did occur. Again,
as stated in F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry.,
149 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1945), at p.190:
Congress, in order to eliminate every
form of discrimination, has provided
that there shall be permitted neither
an intentional nor unintentional deviation from the predetermined schedule
of rates. An intentional act in
granting a shipper a preferential rate
was made a crime. To permit departure
from the regular rate provided only
that it is the result of a misunderstanding or mistake defeats the very
purpose of the law. [Emphasis added.]
It being established that the proscription reaches
innocent misquotations as well as collusive conduct, appellant's
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

argument of an unwarranted and unconstitutional "conclusive
presumption" of a "secret rebate" must fail.

Further,

appellant's narrow and limited interpretation of the application of the I.C.A. is self-contradictory, as noted from
its use of the following quotation (in part) from Professor
Lake's book, on page 5 of its brief, which clearly acknowledges the "sweeping" construction of the Act given by the
courts:

'
. . . The section [I.C.A. § 6(7)] is
so sweeping as to forbid any departure
from the published tariff, however
harmless and however innocent in motive.
It is under this section that the carrier can sue for undercharges made accidentally and is absolved from contracts
to give special services. The courts
have been obligated by its terms to
render judgments in favor of the carriers
which were grossly unjust to the recipient of such casual and harmless preferences. [Emphasis added.]

POINT 2:

JUDGE CROFT CORRECTLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
DENYING APPELLANT RECOVERY UNDER ITS COUNTERCLAIM.
It stands to reason that if a misquotation of freight

rates by a carrier is not an excuse for paying the full
tariff rate, such misquotation, be it negligence or intentional conduct, cannot be the basis for a cause of action by
the aggrieved shipper for damages allegedly resulting from
the misquotation.

Again, there is a plethora of cases hold-

ing to this effect, including cases from the U. S. Supreme
Court; and again, there is no dissent.

In Texas & Pac. Ry.

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Mugg & Dryden, 202 U.S. 242 (1906), a shipper of coal
was quoted an erroneous freight rate and, having sold the
coal at a price based upon such erroneous rate, sued to
recover damages when compelled to pay the proper rate which
was higher.

There, as here, the amount of damage was alleged

to be the difference between the proper rate and the rate
erroneously given with reference to which the sale had been
made.

Mr. Chief Justice White, following the case of Gulf,

C.&S.F. R.R. v. Hefley, 158 U.S. 98 (1895), held specifically
that the shipper could not recover.

The case of 111. Cent.

R. v. Henderson Elevator Co., 226 U.S. 441 (1912), affirmed
the Mugg and Hefley decisions.
Numerous federal circuit and district courts,
following the U. S. Supreme Court decisions, have specifically
held that a shipper has no right to recover damages for a
carrier's misquotation of freight rates.

T. &M. Transp. Co.

v. S. W. Shattuck Chem. Co., 148 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1945) ;
Silent Sioux Corp. v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 262 F.2d 474 (8th
Cir. 1959); Pettibone v. Richardson, 126 F.2d 969 (7th Cir.
1942); Atl. Coastline Ry. v. Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc.,
30 F.Supp. 7 26 (D.C. Va. 1939); Porto Transp. Inc. v. Consol.
Diesel Elec. Corp., 19 F.R.D. 256 (D.C.N.Y. 1956).

As

explained in F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth & D.C. Ry.,
supra, at p.910:

-12-
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The "counterclaim1 of the appellant is
in reality an assertion that if the
carrier is entitled to judgment . . .
on its claim for undercharges, the
appellant is entitled to a judgment in
an equal amount against the carrier
for damages caused by the latterfs
fraud. The appellant, however, as one
who was conclusively presumed and legally
bound to know the tariff rate, cannot
be heard to say that it was deceived or
damaged by false representations about
the rate. [Emphasis added.]
The highest courts of appeal in several states have
also ruled to the same effect.

Graves Truckline, Inc., v.

High Plains Dressed Beef, Inc., 462 P.2d 130 (Kan. 1969);
Atl. Coastline Ry. v. Park, 127 S.E.2d 622 (So. Car. 1962);
Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Marty, 353 P.2d 1095 (Colo.
1960).

As stated in Time-DC, Inc., v. Tappins, Inc., 313 A.2d

234 (N.J. 1973) , at p.236:
In a case, not unlike this one, a
carrier sought to recover undercharges
from a shipper. Shipments had been
made and paid for when the carrier
discovered it had made erroneous
charges. Although the shipper based
its product costs on the quoted charges
and suffered an economic hardship, the
court allowed the carrier to recover
with interest from the dates of shipments because the tariff binds the
carrier and shipper with the force of
law and may not be waived. Since the
tariff is mandatory, no act or omission of the carrier will estop it from
enforcing its applicable provisions.
Miller v. Ideal Cement Co., 214 F.Supp.
717 (D.C. Wyo. 1963).
Additional citations can be found at 88 A.L.R. 2d 1375 at p.1392.
-13-
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POINT 3:

AFFIRMANCE OF JUDGE CROFT'S DECISION WILL NOT
INFRINGE ON APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
Specifically, there is no constitutional issue at

stake here.

The following are reasons why:

1.

Whatever power there is over interstate and

foreign commerce is clearly vested in Congress and individual
rights of shippers and carriers as respects such commerce
are subordinate to the strong and overriding authority of
Congress to regulate in this area.

Under such power and

for the reasons expressed herein, Congress has prohibited
every form of rebate in respect to transportation costs of
interstate shipments regardless of the legal theory or device
upon which such rebates are based.

If the theory or device

is an agreement to ship at a rate lower than what is allowed
by the tariffs, whether such agreement is the result of intentional collusion or inadvertence on the part of the parties to
the agreement, Congress may declare such an agreement null
and void and may declare unenforceable any rights of a party
based thereon, without violating any constitutional rights
of such party.

Norman v. B&O R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1934), at

pp.304-10 and particularly at p.308.
As stated in the case of Davis v. Keystone Steel &
Wire Co., 148 N.E. 47 (111. 1925), discussing Congress1 power
to regulate commerce and prohibit rate discrimination, at p.51:

-14-
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Such interference with the freedom of
contract is not an unconstitutional
interference with the liberty of a
citizen to make contracts, or an unconstitutional deprivation of his property
without due process of law. Congress
has the right to regulate commerce
between the states. It is a proper
exercise of this power in order to
prevent unreasonable extortion and discriminatory rates and discrimination
in the rendition of service and in
preference to persons or localities,
to prescribe the terms on which the
services of carriers, in connection
with interstate transportation, may
be rendered, the nature of those services, the compensation for them, and
the character of the contract between
the carrier and the shipper. . . .
[Emphasis added.]
2.

Defendant's counterclaim is based upon a common

law negligence theory which Congress clearly has the power to
modify without infringing on constitutional rights guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment.

As stated in the case of Denver & Rio

Grande W. R.R. v. Marty, supra, at pp.1097-98, where precisely
the same issues were before the Colorado Supreme Court as are
present in this case (with respect to an intrastate shipment):
Defendant's counsel ably argues that
even though the statute and the cases
render a contract contrary to the
policy of the statute unenforceable,
it should not prevent the assertion
of a claim based wholly upon tort;
that to give effect to the statute to
prevent such a claim deprives the
claimant of important common law
rights. However, as we read the
statute, it prohibits rebates regardless of the legal theory upon which
they are based. To hold that the
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statute affects contract claims only
and is not applicable to demands
growing out of the rate misquotation
which arise on the tort theory would
effectually nullify this statute and
the policy set forth therein. Thus,
the strong policy of the statute
would become meaningless if it could
be circumvented by merely developing
a different legal theory . . .
. . . The further argument of
the defendants is that the refusal to
recognize a right of action based
"' ' upon tort deprives them of a claim
in negligent misrepresentation contrary to the demands of the constitution of Colorado and of the United
States. The contention that the
general assembly cannot modify common
law rights was considered and rejected
in Vogts v. Guerrette, . . . 351 P.2d
851. [Emphasis added.]
The Vogts case (Colo. 1960) based its decision
(that the legislature may modify common law rights of action)
upon U. S. Supreme Court cases which have clearly established
the principle that the constitution does not forbid the creation of new rights, or the abolition of old ones, recognized
by the common law, to obtain a permissible legislative objective.

Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (1929); New York Cent.

R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1916); Munn v. 111., 94 U.S.
113 (1876).

Who will deny that prevention of discrimination

in interstate commerce is a "permissible legislative objective"?
3.

Denial of appellant's right to recover on its

counterclaim is not a "taking" in the Fifth Amendment sense
-16Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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since any damages resulting are consequential only.

The

cases are clear than an indirect injury to property resulting
from legitimate governmental actions intended to benefit the
general public is not protected by the Fifth Amendment.
Legal Tender Cases, 12 Wall. 457 (1870), at pp.551-52; B
Amusement Co. v. U. S., 180 F.Supp. 386 (Ct. CI. 1960);
Laycock v. Kenney, 270 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1959), at p.592.
Again, it cannot be argued that the purposes underlying the
I.C.A. and court decisions interpreting and applying the
same are legitimate and intended to benefit the public as
a whole.
4.

The appellant has no "right" to recover damages

which can be "taken" since no cause of action for misquotation of rates exists.

The right to maintain an action

depends upon the existence of a cause of action which involves
a combination of a right on the part of one party and a violation of such right by another party.

There can be no wrong

without a corresponding right and no breach of a duty by
one person without a corresponding right belonging to some
other person.
In this case the appellant has no legal right to
expect and rely on plaintiff to provide it with information
regarding transportation rates and charges for the shipments
in question, since defendant itself is conclusively presumed
to know the contents of all published tariffs.
-17Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As stated in

Atl. Coastline R.R, v. Park, supra, quoting, in part at p. 62 4,
from Pettibone v. Richardson, supra:
It is clear that the defendant, having
sold the livestock on a cost plus basis,
has suffered a loss, but the decisions
are definite to the effect that under
the present state of facts the railroad
is not liable for this loss . . .
• • • The defendant is conclusively
presumed to know the proper rates . . .
Therefore, the defendant had no right
to rely on the railroad1s quotation of
raxies » . . .
The attempt by resourceful counsel
to circumvent these decisions by charging
that the railroad company was negligent
in failing to correct its error in quoting
rates must fail. The misquotation and
claimant1s reliance upon it are the essence
of the counterclaim. Absent the right of
reliance, the cause of action fails,
whether based on the misquotation or the
delay in correcting it. See also the case
of F. Burkhart Mfg. Co. v. Fort Worth &
D. C. Ry. Co., supra. [Emphasis added.]
5.

It follows then, with no legally enforceable

right extant in the appellant, that respondent violated no
duty owed to appellant when it misquoted the rates.

In fact,

duties of common carriers concerning costs and services incident to transportation of interstate shipments are governed
strictly by what is required in the I.C.A. and in the tariffs
published and filed with the I.C.A.
& Wire Co., supra.

Davis v. Keystone Steel

Simply stated, there is no duty on the

part of respondent, or on the part of any interstate carrier,
to provide a service of quoting rates, let alone of quoting
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them 100% accurately.

To so require would clearly frustrate

the purposes of the I.e.A. which holds carriers and shippers
equally responsible in the law to know and abide by the legal
rates.

This is the precise holding of the Supreme Court of

Minnesota in W. C. Goodnow Coal Co. v. N. Pac. Ry., 162 N.W.
519 (1917).

In ruling that the defendant railroad had no

legal duty to advise the plaintiff shipper of what transportation rates may or may not apply to the shipment in question,
the court said at p.520:
. . . [I]t cannot be conceded that
plaintiff had the . . . right to
require defendant, at its peril
. . . to determine the question whether
a through interstate rate would apply.
The nature of the relations existing
between plaintiff and defendant involved
no such duty on defendant's part, and
the statement of the local agent that
a through rate would apply was but an
expression of an opinion on his part
upon a question of law, for which,
even though erroneous, defendant is not
liable in damages. In fact, both the
character of the shipment from Minneapolis to Montevideo and tariff rate
therefor were matters of law, not of
fact, of which plaintiff, equally with
defendant, was bound to take notice.
Defendant, therefore, violated no
duty it owed plaintiff in not ascertaining before forwarding the car the
tariff rate thereon to Montevideo, and
the trial court properly awarded judgment
for defendant. [Emphasis added.]
6.

Finally, defendant is clearly barred by its own

conduct from alleging a cause of action against respondent.
-19-
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It is universally recognized that any conduct or any contract
of an illegal nature cannot be the proper basis for a legal
or equitable proceeding.

The law simply will not permit one

to take advantage of his own wrong or found any claim or
acquire property by his own wrong, and no court will lend its
aid to a party who grounds his action upon an illegal act
or an illegal contract.

There is no question that by agree-

ing to and, in fact, making payment for transportation of
the shipments in question at a lower rate than what was
authorized by published tariff, appellant (and respondent)
entered into an illegal and unenforceable contract, So. Pac.
v. Miller Abattoir Co., supra, which was clearly in violation
of the I.C.A.

Accordingly, defendant cannot be allowed to

base a counterclaim upon such illegal act to which it was
and still is part and parcel.

Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Kirby,

225 U.S. 155 (1912).
CONCLUSION
This case is not as confusing as appellant has
attempted to make it.
in dispute.

The relevant facts are clear and not

There is an overabundance of law, old and new,

state and federal, including decisions of the U. S. Supreme
Court, directly in point,.

Appellant's argument is incorrect,

illogical, and is not supported in the law.

Respondent

admits that transportation tariffs may be confusing and difficult to interpret at times for both shippers and carriers
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alike.

^his cas^ is vvidenco

of that fact.

But respondent,

like most if not all interstate carriers, does its best to
accommodate requests for rate quotations.
a: *£;.. r

,- .;

i t is generally found and a correction

made a.- -oon as possible.
Carrie •

: -r

If, occasionally,

The law requires no more of the

i it woi ilt : -.\~: *

-.

relegislate the

clear and universally accepted meaning of the Commerce Acts
to restrict their application to intentional misconduct only,
Clear 1} , uny complaints that appellant may have in this
regard should be directed to Congress.
Responded

-?spectfully :--.^_^es\.^ i.:^-

honorable

Court to follow reason and established precedent and affirm
Judge Croft's decision.
DATED this 15th day of April ,A1976.
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